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The main purpose of this article is to examine central issues discussed by Daniel 
Chernilo in his Debating Humanity: Towards a Philosophical Sociology1 (2017). To 
this end, the analysis is divided into two parts. The first part, in addition to giving a 
brief overview of the book’s thematic structure, considers some of its key 
arguments. The second part scrutinizes its most controversial aspects and 
highlights its principal limitations. By way of conclusion, the paper argues that 
Chernilo’s study is a powerful reminder of the fact that a truly comprehensive 
understanding of society requires a critical engagement with the concept of 
humanity. 
 
1. Key arguments 
Chernilo’s Debating Humanity is a major contribution to contemporary social 
theory. It explores the multiple ways in which important scholars in sociology and 
philosophy have made, and continue to make, sense of the distinctiveness of our 
existence as a species by employing foundational concepts such as ‘humanity’, ‘the 
human’, ‘human being(s)’, and ‘human nature’. The book focuses on the works of 
several prominent thinkers of the late twentieth  and  early  twenty-first   centuries.  
Chernilo  describes  his   undertaking  as   a philosophical sociology,2 which is based 
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(1) ‘The anthropological features that define us as human beings are to a large 
extent independent from, but cannot be realized in full outside, social life.’3 In 
other words, the constitutive characteristics that we share as members of 
the same species are irreducible to the historically variable conditions in 
which we find ourselves situated when relating to, interacting with, and 
working upon our natural and social environments. Chernilo identifies and 
scrutinizes seven  of these – in his view, distinctively human – properties by 
drawing on the writings of seven influential intellectuals: self-transcendence 
(Hannah Arendt), adaptation (Talcott Parsons), responsibility (Hans Jonas), 
language (Jürgen Habermas), strong evaluations (Charles Taylor), reflexivity 
(Margaret Archer), and the reproduction of life (Luc Boltanski). 
(2) Our species-distinctive features serve as both the most viable and the most 
reliable foundation for justifying normative arguments – including those 
concerning emancipatory ideas (and ideals) such as justice, dignity, 
democracy, and  the  good life. On this account, a ‘universalistic principle of 
humanity is to be preferred over particularistic conceptions of race, culture, 
identity, and indeed class’,4 since the former transcends both the structural 
and the agential contingency of the latter. Put differently, whereas human 
interests are universalizable, individual and group-specific interests are 
socially exclusive. 
(3) Symbolic forms – including ideas, ideals, and ideologies – are ‘irreducible to 
the material or socio-cultural positions that humans occupy in society’.5 
Their existence and development hinge on our cognitive ‘capacity to reflect 
on what makes us human’6 –  and, one may add, on our performative capacity 
to participate in the historical construction of what defines us as ‘human’. If, 
as members of the same species, we were not equipped with a set of 
anthropological competences, we would not be able to project ourselves into 
the future, let alone to engage in practices of individual self-realization 
and/or societal transformation. Without these species-distinctive features, it 
would be hard, if not impossible, to explain the normative constitution 
permeating all social arrangements. 
 
As Chernilo acknowledges, the use of the label philosophical sociology signals that 
philosophy and sociology are intimately intertwined. Arguably, the label also 
suggests that we should give programmatic priority to the latter, rather than the 
former. It is no accident, then, that Chernilo does not characterize his programme 
as a sociological philosophy, since this concept would, so to speak, turn ‘the terms 
and conditions’ of his endeavour upside down. Chernilo’s key point in this respect, 
however, is that it would be erroneous to construct an artificial and 
counterproductive opposition between philosophy and sociology.7 In his eyes, the 
connections between these two disciplines have been, and are still being, 
reconceptualized at three levels: 
 
(1) From a positivist point of view, philosophical thought constitutes ‘sociology’s 
pre-scientific  heritage’8  –  that  is,   it   serves   the   epistemic   function   of   
forming a presuppositional background horizon on which researchers in the 
humanities and social sciences draw when producing evidence-based 
knowledge. On this – arguably Comtean and Durkheimian – account, 
empirically oriented investigations, rather than speculative philosophical 




developments of institutionalized forms of human cognition, as illustrated in 
the increasing influence of the natural and social sciences.9 
(2) From a socio-reflexive point of view, philosophical thought allows for – and, 
indeed, encourages – ‘epistemological self-clarification’10 in the social 
sciences in general and in sociology in particular. Following this approach, 
philosophy is assigned the role of ‘underlabourer’,11 rather than that of 
‘masterbuilder’. Instead of providing foundational insights (notably with 
regard to existential concerns  such as the nature of being, knowledge, 
morality, logic, and aesthetics), philosophy’s function is orientational in that 
it offers guidance on how to produce reliable epistemic tools and frameworks 
in the social sciences. Paradigmatic dichotomies – such as positivism vs. 
interpretivism, materialism vs. idealism, realism vs. constructivism, 
objectivism vs. subjectivism, determinism vs. voluntarism, collectivism vs. 
individualism, inductivism vs. deductivism – reveal profound intellectual 
divisions in the social sciences, all of which are, to a greater or lesser degree, 
informed by philosophical assumptions about the nature of being, 
knowledge, and logic. On this – arguably Weberian – account, it is vital for 
social scientists to reflect on the relationship between theoretical debates 
(including epistemological disputes) and empirical work (including 
evidence-based research).12 
(3) From a normativist point of view, philosophical thought serves as ‘a source 
from which to draw various normative motifs’.13 Philosophy is concerned 
not only with the way things are, but also, crucially, with the way they 
could and should be. This commitment is articulated especially in moral 
philosophy, but also, to a considerable extent, in social and political 
philosophy. A normativist outlook is prominent in ‘critical’ versions of 
sociology – such as Marxism14 and critical theory,15 but also feminism16 
and postcolonialism17 and several other, explicitly ‘critical’, approaches. It 
indicates that sociology deals with normative questions, particularly those 
related to the critique of power and domination as well as those motivated 
by the search for human empowerment and emancipation. It may also be 
found, however, in ‘conservative’ positions, which express a certain 
amount of nostalgia for, and a desire to re-establish, the socio-historical 
conditions of the past.18 
 
The strengths and weaknesses of each of these perspectives notwithstanding, all of 
them oblige us to take the relationship between sociology and philosophy seriously 
– not only historically and institutionally, but also analytically and normatively. As 
Chernilo puts it, ‘good sociological questions are always, in the last instance, also 
philosophical ones’.19 
In a genealogical fashion, Chernilo reminds his readers that the idea of a 
philosophical sociology is inextricably linked to previous attempts to develop a 
philosophical anthropology.20 This endeavour aims to combine scientific and 
philosophical knowledge about the nature of the human condition, especially in 
terms of its dual constitution: 
 
● as partly natural entities, humans are ‘controlled by their urges, emotions, and 
physico-chemical adaptation to the world’21; 
● as partly cultural entities, humans – owing to their species-constitutive capacities, 
such as normatively codified behaviour, language, consciousness, self-awareness, 





Rather than being immersed in the world as purely instinctual creatures, humans 
grapple with the mysteries of their existence and of their environment. Thus, ‘a 
human is a being who asks what is a human being; humans are beings who ask 
anthropological questions’.23 Humans are equipped with the capacity to make 
rational decisions, to recognize their  fellow members as sharing a set of species-
constitutive endowments, to cope with their immersion in both the natural world 
and the cultural world, and to call potentially everything – including their own 
existence – into question.24 If, in Chernilo’s view, there are two classical 
sociologists who succeeded in bringing together the two intellectual genres in 
which he is primarily interested (that is, sociology and philosophy), then these are 
Karl Marx and Max Weber.25 
The ability to differentiate between  philosophical/normative  and  empirical/scientific  
concerns is essential to developing a conceptually sophisticated, methodologically 
rigorous, evidence-based, and – ultimately – critical sociology. The question remains, 
however, what distinguishes homo sociologicus26 from other discipline-specific homines  
in  the  social sciences – above all, homo oeconomicus and homo psychologicus.27 The 
first is shaped by social roles, norms, conditions, performances, forces, structures, and 
practices. The second is motivated by ‘the calculation of possibilities for personal gain’28 
based on rational decisions. The third is composed of behavioural patterns that are 
driven by ‘unconscious motifs’29 embedded in cognitive dispositions. According to 
Chernilo, the three scientific branches committed to the systematic analysis of these 
homines, irrespective of their differences, share at least two characteristics: (1) They are 
interested in the relationship between individual and society, notably in relation to their 
points of intersection. (2) Rather than allowing for the formulation of a comprehensive 
theory of human nature, each of them tends to underscore the significance of one 
specific anthropological feature – that is, a species-constitutive trait that is particularly 
suitable to confirm the validity of the disciplinary perspective from which the 
intertwinement of individual agency and social forces is interpreted. 
A noteworthy criticism that Chernilo levels at ‘mainstream contemporary 
sociology’30 is that it ‘does not seem to have learned the right lessons’31 from history 
in terms of taking the issue of normativity seriously and recognizing that the 
comprehensive study of social life requires ‘a universalistic principle of humanity 
that offers a richer account of our defining anthropological features’.32 In Chernilo’s 
opinion, even the most influential French sociologist of the late twentieth century, 
Pierre Bourdieu, although he engages with normative issues, ‘does not 
conceptualize normativity sociologically’.33 As a result, we are – according to 
Chernilo – confronted with a ‘“normative-less” depiction of social life’,34 which is 
tantamount to ‘sociology’s very own self-fulfilling dystopia’.35 If, he concludes, we fail 
to grasp the value-laden constitution of human realities, then there is no place for the 
concept of ‘the normative’ within our – arguably reductive – ‘ontologies of the 
social’.36 
The rise of posthumanism  has made recent debates on the nature of humanity  even  
more complex.37 Crucial in this regard is the contention that we have entered a 
‘posthuman world’. Controversies over the role of artificial intelligence, cognitive 
science, biotechnology, and digital technology, as well as disputes over climate change 
and the status of other living creatures in our environment, indicate the emergence of a 
world in which traditional boundaries – such as those between ‘the nonhuman’ and  
‘the  human’,  ‘the  natural’ and ‘the cultural’, ‘the objective’ and ‘the normative’ – 
appear to be increasingly blurred. The question of ‘what makes us human’38 remains a 
source of heated discussion.39 Scholars whose works  are  rightly  or  wrongly  




foundationalism that underpins traditional ‘humanist’ ideas’40 about the world in 
general and society in particular. Exploring key tenets of this antifoundationalist stance, 
Chernilo covers three versions of posthumanist thinking – namely, the contributions 
made by Bruno Latour,41 Rosi Braidotti,42 and Andy Clark.43 
 
● Latour has made a case for developing an actor-network theory that transcends 
the traditional human/nonhuman dichotomy. An important part of this endeavour 
is the attempt to locate agency in networks, which, by definition, are composed of 
both human and nonhuman elements. Networks,  in the Latourian  sense,  can be 
described as ‘series of association(s)’, ‘series of instauration(s)’, and ‘chains of 
reference(s)’.44 Paradoxically, their stability, solidity, and universality cannot be 
divorced from their malleability, flexibility, and particularity.45 In a world that is 
constituted by ‘an endless flow of networks’,46 traditional dualistic ontological 
categories (such as ‘nature’/‘culture’ and ‘individual’/‘society’) need to be 
understood as hybrids, rather than as independent – let alone isolated – realms of 
existence. 
● Drawing on the  writings of Gilles Deleuze and  Félix  Guattari, Braidotti 
presents    a radical critique of humanism. In a post-Heideggerian fashion, she 
conceives of ‘Humanism’ as a ‘violent and exclusionary master-ideology of the 
West’,47 which embodies the negative and detrimental, if not evil, dimensions 
of the project of modernity.48 On this view,  as Chernilo  points  out, humanism 
no longer serves  as a ‘viable articulation of our contemporary normative 
sensibility’,49 since it is ‘already dead’.50 A stern critic of anthropocentrism, 
androgenism, and racism (among other forms of discrimination),51 she seems 
to have ‘no difficulty in ubiquitously appealing to these same traditional 
humanist values’52 that she aims to deconstruct in her attack on humanism. 
Paradoxically, then, her approach is simultaneously promodern and 
antimodern: promodern, in the sense that her intellectual undertaking involves 
‘the need to speak “on behalf”’53 of marginalized groups, thereby addressing ‘a 
quintessentially modern political issue’54; antimodern, in the sense that she is 
suspicious of ‘the values and institutions of the modern world’,55 given their 
complicity with, if not outright endorsement and proactive creation of, 
mechanisms of social domination. A striking limitation of these kinds of 
posthumanism is that they ‘cannot consistently articulate their normative 
positions because they are unable to clarify what [. . .] the human core for which 
they are prepared to make a positive case’56 actually is. In short, they are guilty 
of being caught in a ‘performative contradiction’57 in that, effectively, they 
subscribe to an ‘antinormativist normativism’ and a ‘normativist antinormati- 
vism’ (and, correspondingly, an ‘antihumanist humanism’ and a ‘humanist 
antihumanism’), depending on which side of the argument they emphasize in a 
particular context. We cannot have it both ways. 
● Clark, who is one of the proponents of the ‘extended mind’ thesis,58 insists 
on the pivotal role that external factors – including technological devices – 
play in the unfolding of cognitive processes. This approach can be 
considered an externalist version of posthumanism, which ‘points towards 
the softening – if not the downright dissolution – of a self-contained idea of 
the human being and its agential powers’.59 On this account, our 
environment forms an integral element, if not the ontological foundation, of 
our mental apparatus. Chernilo draws attention to three presuppositions 




(1) Human actors are ‘defined by the constant interplay between mind, body, 
and world’.60 
(2) The design of robots, notably in terms of their intelligence and mobility, 
provides clues into the features that make us human and, as Clark 
eloquently puts it, into the fact that ‘[t]he human agent [. . .] is nature’s 
expert at becoming expert’.61 
(3) In the current era, humans have been elevated to ‘natural-born cyborgs’.62 
Owing to constant technological innovation, evolutionary developments 
are increasingly shaped by the interpenetration and hybridization of 
plants, animals, and humans. 
 
For Chernilo, these three assumptions are part of the posthumanist journey, on 
which our species appears to have embarked in a way that demonstrates not only 
that the natural can teach the artificial but also that ‘the artificial can teach the 
natural’.63 Whether we focus on plants, animals, humans, robots, or cyborgs, the 
posthumanist moment reflects the end of the modern dream of ‘human 
supremacy and exceptionalism’.64 In this context, it is imperative to acknowledge 
that ‘[i]ndividual cognizing [. . .] is organism-centred even if it is not organism-
bound’.65 Thus, cognitive expansion is inconceivable without, but not necessarily 
determined by, an organic core.66 
 
What follows in subsequent chapters is a tour de force. In Chapter 1, Chernilo 
contextualizes modern debates on humanism. He does so by elucidating the 
contributions made by Jean-Paul Sartre, Martin Heidegger, and Jacques Derrida to 
our understanding of ‘humanist values’ and ‘the anthropological question’. In the 
remaining chapters, he explores what he regards as seven important 
anthropological properties by drawing on the writings of seven prominent 
thinkers: self-transcendence (Arendt), adaptation (Parsons), responsibility (Jonas), 
language (Habermas), strong evaluations (Taylor), reflexivity (Archer), and the 
reproduction of life (Boltanski). Each chapter offers an in-depth analysis of one of 
the aforementioned properties from the perspective of the respective scholar. 
Finally, the ‘Epilogue’67 comprises a succinct, yet critical, overview    of the main 
issues examined in the book. Given their relevance to Chernilo’s overall argument, 
these issues are worth considering in detail. 
The idea of a philosophical anthropology – as proposed by thinkers such as Max 
Scheler,68 Ernst Cassirer,69 and Helmuth Plessner70 – faces a dilemma: on the one 
hand,  it may be rejected as ‘poor science’ for being ‘too philosophical’; on the other 
hand, it may be discarded as ‘poor philosophy’ for being ‘too empirical’.71 A similar 
line of criticism may be levelled at the project of philosophical sociology – and, more 
broadly, social theory. Philosophy, in particular, has the reputation of being a 
discipline that is systematically protected by academic gatekeepers, who are 
reluctant to admit scholars from adjacent – notably social-scientific – realms of 
inquiry, including anthropology and sociology. 
In relation to his own undertaking, Chernilo maintains that his ‘purpose was 
never to offer a complete or exhaustive set of anthropological features with which 
to define the human in human beings’.72 Rather, his aim is to shed light on ‘those 
anthropological features that are of key importance at two levels’73: first, they are 
‘autonomous vis-à-vis society even if their actualization is itself social’74; second, 
they   permit   us   ‘to   articulate   more   explicitly   the    grounds   on       which 




of whether these are raised by laypersons or experts. Having examined seven 
anthropological properties, all of which – in his view – meet these two 
requirements, Chernilo seeks  to  demonstrate  that  their  careful  consideration  
permits  us  to  ‘rearticulate      a universalistic idea of humanity as something that 
human beings have themselves created’.76 He summarizes the main idea 
underlying this venture as follows: 
 
Only an idea of humanity that results from humans’ own properties, and then allows 
humans to reflect further on themselves as the creators of their own ideas and 
institutions, can then [be] turned into a normative one: a human is a being who does 
philosophical anthropology.77 
 
Based on this vision, Chernilo – in his ‘Epilogue’78 – scrutinizes several themes that 
run through his argument. 
To begin with, there is the idea of ‘normative descriptions’.79 As Chernilo 
illustrates throughout the book, ‘[t]he tension between descriptive and normative 
claims has proved central in the development of the social sciences of the past 150 
years’.80 Social scientists are confronted with a double-task: (1) to offer accurate 
and reliable representations of the world; (2) to make value judgements about the 
quality, desirability, and defensibility of social constellations and practices. In other 
words, social scientists grapple with both the diagnostic question of how the social 
world is organized and the normative question of how the social world ought to be 
organized. Chernilo’s insistence on the concept of ‘normative descriptions’, 
however, adds a level of complexity to this issue. Drawing on Hannah Arendt’s 
work,81 and stressing the validity of her contention that ‘concentration camps are, 
literally, “hell on earth”’,82 he reminds us that the description of some (objectively 
existing) social phenomena depends on our cognitive (and, effectively, evaluative) 
capacity to account for their normative dimensions. This perspective is inextricably 
linked to three commitments: 
 
(1) a universalist conception of humanity, according to which all individuals – 
irrespective of the degree to which they are divided by sociological variables, 
such as class, ethnicity, gender, age, and ability – are regarded, and treated, 
as members of the same species, united by a set of anthropological 
capacities; 
(2) an evaluativist conception of normativity, according to which the quality of 
behavioural, ideological, and institutional forms of sociality is assessed in 
terms  of the extent to which they promote or obstruct ‘the development of 
our generic human potentials’83; 
(3) a critical conception of the social sciences, according to which their 
‘explanatory register [. . .] reconnects with the normative questions’84 that 
are commonly posed in, and associated with, philosophical modes of 
inquiry. 
 
Another theme that runs through Chernilo’s analysis is what he describes as ‘the 
scandal of the human need for an anthropology’.85  This issue refers to what 
Chernilo considers    a significant dilemma in Immanuel Kant’s anthropology, 
namely the scandal of reason (as discussed in Chapters 2, 3, and 4).86 According to 




● On the one hand, reason is, so to speak, trans-anthropological, in the sense that 
‘the logical integrity of the categories of understanding’,87 including the 
categorical imperative of Kant’s deontological ethics, rests on ‘a claim to 
universality’88 that, due to its quest for rational purity, ‘is not specifically 
human’.89 
● On the other hand, reason is, so to speak, intra-anthropological, in the sense 
that the socio-historical constitution of our categories of understanding, 
including the spatiotemporal contingencies permeating context-laden 
constructions and applications of morality, hinges on the presence of 
particularities that, while ‘tailored anthropocentrically to human needs’,90 
cannot be divorced from the cognitive and performative resources by virtue 
of which we build structurally variable societies. 
 
Reflecting on the scandal of reason, we are faced with another problem: it appears 
that, precisely in relation to the existential issues that are most important to us, we, 
as members of the same species, have found it difficult, if not impossible, to provide 
satisfying answers to ‘the big questions’ by virtue of reason. Both transcendental 
questions – for instance, about the meaning of life and death, the (non)existence of 
God, and the (im)possibility an afterlife – and immanent questions – for instance, 
about how (not) to live one’s life – continue to be matters of concern that, the 
epistemic power of human rationality notwithstanding, will never be resolved in a 
categorical, conclusive, and irrefutable manner. Chernilo’s argument with respect 
to this challenge is threefold: 
 
(1) As a knowledge-seeking species, we never have been, and never will be, 
satisfied with the (essentially tentative) answers we provide to existential 
questions, including the question of what makes us human. 
(2) The  search   for  answers  to  these  questions  is  not  only  a  cognitive  but  
also   a normative affair. 
(3) What we may  call  ‘everyday  anthropocentrism’  is  built  into  our  condition  
as a species in that ‘human beings are a key theme and cause of concern only 
for humans themselves’.91 
 
Another salient topic of Chernilo’s book is ‘the relationship(s) between science 
and philosophy’.92 Defending the project of a ‘philosophical sociology’ (notably in 
Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 8), Chernilo insists that ‘philosophical concerns are no longer 
independent from scientific ones’.93 As illustrated in the rise of posthumanism, 
hardly any major philosophical standpoint – notably in fundamental areas of 
inquiry such as ontology, epistemology, ethics, logic, and aesthetics – can be 
defended unless it is informed by cutting-edge insights from both the natural 
sciences and the social sciences. 
This is not to suggest that philosophical explorations are no longer relevant to 
human life in general and to scientific investigations in particular. Rather, this is to 
recognize that, within the numerous realms of the production and circulation of 
knowledge, the balance of power has shifted. Instead of conceiving of the relationship 
between philosophy and science in terms of an epistemic antinomy, it is vital to 
grasp their interdependence. Far from seeking ‘to create the conditions for its own 
dissolution’,94 philosophy needs to concede that it finds itself in the tricky position of 
having to ‘explain philosophically how the debacle of its own claims to knowledge 
has actually come about’.95 Arguably, ‘the big questions’, including the 




remain issues whose comprehensive study requires a combination of philosophical 
and scientific inquiries. 
The quest for knowledge about our status in the universe may be considered ‘a 
transcultural and transhistorical constant’,96 in the sense that it forms an integral 
part    of the human condition. At the heart of this journey lie the construction of 
‘self-knowledge’ and processes of ‘self-objectification’,97 whereby humans can 
define their  place in the universe, while mobilizing their cognitive resources to 
stabilize their ‘organic adaptation’,98 permitting them to adjust to their natural and 
social environments. Just as ‘self-knowledge as a cognitive proposition does not 
necessarily  lead to  self-legislation as  a normative claim’,99 however, Verstand 
(reason) is no guarantee of Vernunft (prudence), let alone of Urteilskraft (power of 
judgement). 
Another central issue discussed by Chernilo is what he refers to as ‘the 
intractability of human nature in the social sciences’.100 The question of ‘human 
nature’ will not go away; it will continue to be posed and debated by social 
scientists – even (or perhaps especially) by those, such as social constructivists, 
who reject the very idea and associate it with biological essentialism and/or 
determinism. As illustrated in Chapters 3, 5, and 7, Chernilo subscribes to the view 
that ‘ideas of the social need to be looked at in their  own right’.101 Contrary to 
methodological individualism, social phenomena cannot be explained by reference 
to personal preferences, subjective motivations, and/or rational choices. Sociality, 
however, is not an exclusively human phenomenon. Other species – such as ‘ants, 
bees, dolphins, or chimpanzees’102 – are also profoundly social. 
The question, therefore, is to what extent human sociality differs from that of other 
species. Species-constitutive elements – such as culture, language, consciousness, 
self-awareness, morality, aesthetic judgement, and reason – need to be taken into 
account when addressing this matter. If Chernilo is right to assume that other 
‘species do not dwell on the scandal of reason’103 (or, indeed, on the scandals of 
culture, language, consciousness, self-awareness, morality, or aesthetic judgement), 
then it is likely that our cognitive capacities, which we develop by interacting and 
communicating with our fellow beings [Mitmenschen], represent an essential part of 
what makes us ‘human’. It is in this – broadly anthropological – spirit that Chernilo 
seeks ‘to offer an explicit account of those human properties that allow humans to 
reflect on their own specificity and worthiness’104 and, hence, on the characteristics 
that, although they do not raise them ‘above’ nature, make them – at least in some 
respects – fundamentally different from other creatures. 
Finally, there is ‘the problem of anthropocentrism’.105 Drawing on the work of 
Edmund Husserl,106 Chernilo affirms that ‘science and philosophy are not 
particularly concerned with the human being’.107 In terms of their investigative 
outlook, the former focuses on ‘the nature of organic life and the structure of the 
cosmos’,108 whereas the latter centres on ‘reason and intentionality’.109 In order to 
challenge anthropocentrism, however, it is necessary to engage in ‘a dual act of 
decentring’110: 
 
(1) Humans must overcome their proclivity to put themselves ‘at the centre of 
their   explanations  about  the  functioning of the   cosmos,   culture,   and 
society’.111 
(2) Humans need to be ready to ‘accept that there is nothing necessary about 




The ‘Copernican turn’113 teaches us not only that the sun, rather than the earth, is 
at the centre of our solar system, but also that, from a scientific point of view, it is 
advisable to be wary of philosophical and theological concerns arising from the 
relativization of humanity’s position in the universe. If the deconstruction of 
anthropocentrism involves ensuring that humans stop turning ‘themselves into the 
standard with which to measure everything that takes place in the world’114 (and 
beyond), then such a decentred viewpoint is eye-opening in that it permits the 
earth’s dominant species to put its existence, including its self-righteous ambition 
to rule a tiny part of the universe as a planetary hegemon, into perspective. 
Granted, ‘the fact that human beings are not at the centre of the universe does not 
change the fact that they are at the centre of their own human life’.115 After all, we 
learn to relate to both the external world and our inner world by relating to other 
human beings. There is no development of Verstand (reason) without one’s ability to 
engage in processes of Verständigung (communication). The semantic connection 
between Verstand and Verständigung is no accident: it hints at the evolutionary 
intertwinement of our (cognitive) capacity to reason and our (recognitive) capacity 
to relate to the world by relating to one another.116 ‘It is from mouth to mouth that 
we have grown from Mund to Mündigkeit.’117 In accordance with this 
intersubjectivist spirit, Debating Humanity does not attempt to uproot us from the 
social core of our existence. Rather, it draws attention to the fact that sociality 
permeates all species-constitutive features of humanity. 
Let us, in the remainder of this article, consider some controversial aspects and 
limitations of Chernilo’s book. 
 
2. Critical reflections 
2.1. Straw-man claims? 
A noteworthy weakness of Chernilo’s analysis is that, on several occasions, it creates a 
straw man to defend the author’s version of ‘philosophical sociology’. Let us, for the 
sake of brevity, consider only one example: while ‘ideas of human supremacy and 
exceptionalism’118 may be a constitutive part of modern anthropocentric  
imaginaries,  it  is difficult to think of any contemporary social scientist who would 
seriously argue that ‘humans are self-contained’.119 One finds numerous straw-man 
claims of this kind in Chernilo’s book. Admittedly, they serve the vital function of 
illustrating the essence of one’s position by contrasting it with the relatively 
arbitrary construction of radically opposed views. Straw-man assertions remain a 
fallacy, however, in that they are based on erroneous propositions invoked to make 
one’s argument appear stronger, and perhaps also more original, than that of the 
alleged opponent(s). Of course, most academics and researchers are, to a greater or 
lesser degree, culpable of this ‘straw-man practice’ when developing and defending 
their arguments. This self-critical acknowledgment, however, does not provide 
straw-man claims with epistemic validity. 
 
2.2. A methodological limitation as a substantive limitation? 
A striking limitation of Chernilo’s book is that each chapter focuses only on one (or 




illustrating a scholar’s conception of the human.120 This methodological approach 
is problematic for a number of reasons. 
 
(1) It is far from clear what criteria Chernilo applied when making his respective 
choice. The decision to opt for one (or two) text(s) in which ‘I think they 
succeed in making apparent their conception of the human’121 is a fairly 
arbitrary methodological move (and criterion), since other commentators 
may suggest they think they can accomplish this, in an even more convincing 
fashion, by drawing on other texts by the same authors. 
(2) To focus only on one (or two) text(s) per author seems hardly sufficient, 
since this represents a rather narrow sample of sources, especially in light of 
the fact that the scholars in question have produced numerous important 
works. If we confine our sample to one (or two) text(s) by each of them, we 
run the risk of providing a limited and simplistic account of what, in reality, 
may be a far more complex  and, in many cases, tension-laden picture. 
(3) Most major thinkers go through different intellectual phases – say, an ‘early’,        
a ‘middle’, and a ‘final’ phase. Most of them revise their main positions on 
key  subjects, often in a radical fashion. A matter as fundamental as that of 
their respective understanding of the human is unlikely to be dealt with 
(implicitly or explicitly) in an entirely consistent manner by any of these 
scholars. In order to provide an accurate picture of their conceptions of the 
human, which may vary across different stages of their careers, it seems 
necessary to cover at least one seminal work from each phase, spelling out – 
if and where necessary – the tensions within their intellectual trajectory with 
regard to a particular issue of significance. 
 
2.3. Whose humanity? 
Seven (or, if we include Chapter 1, ten) thinkers feature centrally in Chernilo’s 
analysis: Arendt, Parsons, Jonas, Habermas, Taylor, Archer, and Boltanski (as well 
as Sartre,  Heidegger, and Derrida). In terms of the underlying ‘demographics’  of  
Chernilo’s  study, these scholars can be classified as follows122: 
 
● Gender: 
– female (Archer, Arendt) 
– male (Boltanski, Derrida, Habermas, Heidegger, Jonas, Parsons, Sartre, 
Taylor) 




– white (Archer, Arendt, Boltanski, Derrida, Habermas, Heidegger, Jonas, 
Parsons, Sartre, Taylor) 
→ All main scholars featuring in this volume are white. 
 
● Religion/ethnicity: 




– Jewish/Jewish-secular (Arendt, Boltanski, Derrida, Jonas) 
– Protestant/Congregationalist (Habermas, Parsons) 
→ In terms of their ethno-cultural background, the majority of the main scholars 
featuring in this volume are Judeo-Christian. 
 
 
● Geographical origin: 
– Anglo-European (Archer) 
– continental European (Arendt, Boltanski, Derrida, Habermas, Heidegger, 
Jonas, Sartre) 
– North American (Parsons, Taylor) 
→ The overwhelming majority of the main scholars featuring in this volume 
are continental European, two are North American, and one is Anglo-
European. No major intellectual figures from other continents play a pivotal 
role in Chernilo’s analysis. 
 
● National origin: 
– British (Archer) 
– Canadian (Taylor) 
– French (Boltanski, Derrida, Sartre) 
– German (Habermas, Heidegger) 
– German-American (Arendt, Jonas) 
– US-American (Parsons) 
→ The majority of the main scholars featuring in this volume are 
German/German-American, with French scholars in second place and 
British, Canadian, and US-American scholars in joint-third place. No non-
European or non-Anglo-American nationalities are represented. 
 
● Linguistic specificity: 
– Anglophone (Arendt, Parsons, Jonas, Taylor, Archer) 
– Francophone (Boltanski, Derrida, Sartre) 
– Germanophone (Arendt, Habermas, Heidegger, Jonas) 
→ The overwhelming majority of the main scholars featuring in this volume 
are  Anglophone and/or Germanophone and/or Francophone. Thus, in terms 
of the linguistic specificity of their major writings (that is, in terms of their 
main working language[s]), their oeuvres are firmly situated in the 
hermeneutic horizon of the three most influential (and arguably 
hegemonic) European languages in the humanities and social sciences. 
 
● Epochal situatedness: 
– scholars whose works were produced in the early modern/modern period 
(early- and mid-twentieth century) – i.e. Heidegger (1889–1976), Parsons 
(1902–1979), Jonas (1903–1993), Sartre (1905–1980), Arendt (1906–
1975) 
– scholars whose main works were produced in the contemporary or late 
modern (mid-/late-twentieth and early twenty-first centuries) – i.e. 
Habermas  (1929–),      Derrida  (1930–2004),     Taylor  (1931–),     Boltanski  




→ Broadly speaking, the main scholars featuring in this volume are modern or 
late modern thinkers – that is, they produced their key works either in the early- 
and mid- twentieth century or in the mid-/late-twentieth and early twenty-
first centuries. 
 
● Generational belonging: 
– born in the last decade of the nineteenth century (1890–1899) – i.e. 
Heidegger (1889–1976) 
– born in the first decade of the twentieth century (1900–1910) – i.e. Parsons 
(1902–1979), Jonas (1903–1993), Sartre (1905–1980), Arendt (1906–
1975) 
– born in the mid-twentieth century – i.e. Habermas (1929–), Derrida (1930–
2004), Taylor (1931–), Boltanski (1940–), Archer (1943–) 
→ Broadly  speaking,   the   main   scholars   featuring  in this volume (with one 
exception) were born in the early or mid-twentieth century. Their respective 
works were all, to a greater or lesser extent, influenced by the political 
climate of post-war periods (i.e. after World War I and World War II, 
respectively). 
 
● Discursive/ideological positioning: 
– reactionary-conservative (Heidegger) 
– moderate-conservative (Jonas, Parsons) 
– moderate-progressive (Archer, Derrida, later Habermas, Taylor) 
– radical-progressive (Arendt, Boltanski, earlier Habermas, Sartre) 
→ The overwhelming majority of the main scholars featuring in this volume are, 
broadly speaking, progressive in terms of their normative positioning. 
 
● Disciplinary background(s) and/or speciality(ies): 
– philosophy (Arendt, Derrida, Heidegger, Jonas, Sartre, Taylor) 
– sociology (Archer, Boltanski, Parsons) 
– philosophy and sociology (Habermas) 
→ Six of the ten main scholars featuring in this volume are known primarily as 
philosophers,  three   of   them   as   sociologists,   and   one   of   them   as   
both a philosopher and a sociologist. 
 
 
There is not much point in taking this ‘demographic’ perspective on Chernilo’s 
study too far. It illustrates, however, that critics may complain that his inquiry 
suffers from the typical ‘-isms’ that – according to social researchers interested in 
intersectionally constituted power relations – need to be challenged, 
deconstructed, and subverted: canonical sexism (‘malestream’); canonical racism 
(‘all white’); canonical ethnocentrism (predominantly Judeo-Christian); canonical 
Western-centrism (exclusively European or Anglo-American); canonical nationalism 
(predominantly European and North-American nationalities); canonical 
linguacentrism (Anglocentrism, Germanocentrism, and/or Francocentrism); 
canonical modernism (‘all modern’); canonical ageism (from ‘old’ generations); 
canonical ideologism (all placeable within the left-right political spectrum); 
canonical tribalism (all sociologists or philosophers). 
Thus, his detractors – including postmodernists, poststructuralists, postcolonialists, 
feminists,         and         intersectionalists        –                will         object                         that  




male, white, Judeo-Christian, Western, Northern, Anglo-/Germano-/Francophone, 
modern, 'old', politically predictable, and largely discipline-bound scholars. In short, 
Chernilo may be accused of remaining trapped in the established canons of the 
humanities and social sciences. What emerges, on this account, is an understanding of 
humanity that, although it may be nominally ‘universalist’, is effectively ‘particularist’. 
Regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with this line of criticism, it would have 
been useful if Chernilo had explicitly addressed this – increasingly common – source 
of controversy in further detail. 
 
2.4. Between foundationalist and contextualist normativism? 
Chernilo’s entire project is based on the assumption that ‘our shared anthropological 
features as members of the human species remain the best option to justify 
normative arguments’.123 As promising as such a universalist – and, by implication, 
cosmopolitan – premise may seem, we need to concede that it applies mainly to 
foundational, rather than context-specific, arguments. To be precise, the previous 
supposition should be reformulated as follows: ‘our shared anthropological features 
as members of the human species remain the best option to justify foundational 
normative arguments’. Thus, the validity of Chernilo’s preceding assertion, which is 
crucial to his universalist undertaking, depends on the kind of claim one seeks to 
defend. It certainly applies to foundationalist arguments, but it does not necessarily 
apply to nonfoundationalist (i.e. context-specific) arguments. 
Do our anthropological features, as Chernilo implies, really remain the best 
option to justify normative arguments about who should do the washing-up, 
whether there should be another UK referendum on EU membership, or how much 
milk powder – or condensed milk – milk chocolate should contain? Admittedly, 
some central normative arguments (including those made in the area of social 
policy) are intrinsically related to our anthropological features – notably issues 
regarding the asymmetrical distribution of resources and power, due to the 
pervasive influence of key sociological variables such as class, ethnicity, gender, 
age, and ability. Even in realms of social inequality, however, our shared 
anthropological features – although they may serve as a general reference point to 
justify normative positions – do not ultimately determine the ways in which, in the 
best-case scenario, the unforced force of the better argument124 or, in the worst-
case scenario, the forceful force of the greatest legitimate power125 will pan out. 
 
2.5. False dichotomies? 
A striking feature of Chernilo’s argument is that it is based on a number of 
dichotomies, some of which unsympathetic critics may find, at best, problematic or, 
at worst, untenable. Let us consider some of them. 
 
● Natural vs. Conscious: 
 
[. . .] a dual approach to human beings results from, and must be preserved, because 
of the duality of the human condition itself: humans are partly natural bodies that 
are controlled by their urges, emotions, and physico-chemical adaptation to the 
world and partly conscious beings that are defined by their intellectual, aesthetic, 




The natural/conscious dichotomy is far from unproblematic. Humans are not 
the only species equipped with a complex cognitive apparatus.127 Granted, the 
capacity to develop intellectual skills may well be a species-distinctive privilege 
of human beings. Yet, there is considerable evidence to suggest that other 
species also have a sense of aesthetic appreciation of the world as well as a 
sense of moral judgement.128 Unless we link these properties to rationality (in 
the threefold sense of Verstand, Vernunft, and Urteilskraft), it is far from 
obvious to what extent the aforementioned ‘anthropological’ properties are 
exclusively human. If they are not, then Chernilo’s natural/conscious 
dichotomy collapses. 
 
● Bio vs. Socio: Chernilo is right to assert that ‘[t]he proposition that humans are 
social beings is [. . .] only another [. . .] way of restating the obvious’.129 The 
same applies to the proposition that humans are biological beings. Thus, 
‘approaches such as socio-biology are insufficient’,130 since they fail to address 
‘the existential aspects of the question what is a human being’.131 This insight, 
however, does not overcome the bio/socio dichotomy, which – especially in 
terms of the nature/nurture divide – continues to be central to current 
debates on the relationship between genetic and environmental factors in 
shaping the human condition. Moreover, it is far from clear what ‘the 
existential aspects’132 defining what makes us human actually are – not to 
mention the fact that, arguably, these have both biological and sociological 
components. One may focus on culture, language, consciousness, self-
awareness, morality, aesthetic judgement, reason, or any other ‘existential 
aspect’ of humanity. All our species-constitutive features have developed, and 
continue to develop, out of a complex interaction between genetic and 
environmental factors. This interaction lies at the core of human evolution. 
Given the intimate intertwinement of genetic and environmental factors, one 
may call both the validity and the usefulness of the very distinction between 
‘bio’ and ‘socio’ into question. 
 
● Natural vs. Cultural: 
 
The human body has an ambivalent position for humans themselves: it is an object 
in the natural world, it is the ‘container’ of our anthropological features and it is 
also a cultural artefact.133 
At first glance, this statement offers a succinct and accurate way of describing the 
ambivalence of the human condition, drawing attention to our immersion in both 
the natural world and the cultural world, both of which have left their imprint on 
the genealogy of the human body, which serves as a carrier of our species-
constitutive capacities. On closer analysis, however, the above statement is 
problematic on several counts: 
 
(1) It applies not only to humans but also to animals, since other species – 
including nonhuman primates – also develop culturally variable and context-
specific patterns of behaviour.134 
(2) It gives a dualistic, rather than multilayered, account of our existential 





physically constituted and socially codified realms of existence. Yet, it does 
not highlight the degree to which an actor experiences both ‘the’ objective 
world and ‘our’/‘their’ normative world through ‘his’ or ‘her’ subjective 
world, to which he or she has privileged access. 
(3) It fails to elucidate the extent to which the conceptual differentiation between 
‘natural’ and ‘cultural’ is based on the epistemic – and, hence, interpretative – 
construction of ideal types.135 These ideal types, however, may distort the 
ontological intertwinement of ‘the natural’ and ‘the cultural’ in human life 
forms. 
 
It comes as little surprise, then, that Chernilo makes the anthropocentric 
claim that ‘the most fundamental human trait is the fact that we come into a 
world that, because it pre-exists us, is posed to us as a challenge’.136 Once 
again, we need to acknowledge that other living beings also experience the 
world as a challenge and that it also pre-exists them. One may argue (in an 
anthropocentric fashion) that – due to our psychological make-up and owing 
to the multiple ways in which we engage with, attribute meaning to, and act 
upon the world – our existence is even more of a challenge. If we add 
species-constitutive elements – such as culture, language, consciousness, 
self-awareness, morality, aesthetic judgement, and reason (along with the 
triadic interplay of Verstand, Vernunft, and Urteilskraft) – to the equation, 
then this challenge becomes even more complicated. It would be 
presumptuous, however, to jump on the anthropocentric bandwagon of 
human exceptionalism, let alone human supremacy, by disregarding the fact 
that, by definition, any living creature experiences the world as a challenge 
when seeking to find its place within it and to fulfil its will to live. In other 
words, the capacity to experience the world as a challenge is not ‘the most 
fundamental human trait’, but, rather, one of the most fundamental traits of 
any living being. In this sense, we  need to replace somewhat narrow forms 
of anthropocentrism with existentially inclusive forms of vitalism.137 
Viewed in this light, the following contention is problematic: 
What is uniquely human is the original impulse that leads us to play games at all: 
having fun, socializing, creating and improving on rules, getting better at them, 
etc.138 
Homo sapiens may be conceived of as Homo ludens.139 Admittedly, it is 
important to account for our playful nature, including the potential for 
creativity that is built into the most habitualized forms of human action.140 
We need to recognize, however, that other species – including dolphins and 
chimpanzees141 – also have playful and creative ways of relating to and 
acting upon the world. 
 
● Transcendental vs. Immanent: Discussing ‘the scandal of reason’ in Kant’s 
thought, Chernilo draws a distinction between ‘transcendental questions about 
the existence of god and the possibility of life after death and immanent ones 
about how I am to handle my own free will’.142 This distinction, however, is far 
from uncontroversial. Questions about life, death, and divine powers may be 
considered an immanent part of the human condition. At the same time, 
questions about one’s life course, individual and collective decision-making 
processes, and the  (im)possibility  of  free will may be regarded as 




relevance surpass the transient scope of spatiotemporally delimited life forms. 
Put differently, the immanence of transcendence and the transcendence of 
immanence lie at the heart of the human condition. 
 
● Scientific vs. Philosophical: Crucial to Chernilo’s analysis is the distinction 
between ‘the scientific’ and ‘the philosophical’. As he spells out, ‘the project of 
philosophical sociology works within a contemporary context in which 
philosophical concerns are no longer independent from scientific ones’.143 The 
problem with this assertion,  however, is that it fails to concede that 
philosophical concerns have never been independent from scientific ones. 
From the beginning of its evolutionary journey, Homo sapiens has 
distinguished itself from other creatures as a sapient species. Science is the 
systematic attempt to generate knowledge on the basis of testable 
descriptions, analyses, interpretations, and explanations of particular aspects 
of the universe. Philosophy provides the discursive theatre for the in-depth 
inquiry into fundamental questions – notably those related to the nature of 
being, knowledge, morality, logic, and aesthetics. Ever since we entered the 
historical stage, we have embarked on an evolutionary journey as knowledge-
seeking and knowledge-generating entities. The level of development of 
epistemic standards in ancient human life forms and early civilizations 
notwithstanding, science and philosophy have been intimately intertwined 
ever since they came into existence. 
Chernilo is right to insist that ‘it is not enough for philosophy to accept that 
it has indeed lost its position of privilege vis-à-vis scientific knowledge’.144 We 
may add to this contention that, for some, the relationship between the two 
has, in the history of human inquiry, always been the other way around: 
science, owing to its empirical outlook and  capacity  to  drive  technological  
developments,  has  always  been  in a position of privilege vis-à-vis the 
somewhat speculative character of philosophical knowledge. Irrespective of 
one’s interpretation of this epistemic rivalry, it does not follow from the 
previous reflection that philosophy has to ‘explain philosophically how the 
debacle of its own claims to knowledge has actually come about’.145 In fact, it 
may choose to do so both philosophically and scientifically. Philosophy’s epis- 
temic validity claims have always been, and will always remain, closely 
interwoven with those raised in scientific endeavours. 
Rather than lamenting ‘the inability of European sociology to differentiate 
between philosophical/normative concerns, on the one hand, and strictly 
empirical/scientific ones, on the other’,146 we need to acknowledge their  pro- 
found interdependence and interpenetration. Furthermore, we  must  avoid  
linking  (1)  ‘the normative’  primarily or exclusively  to ‘the philosophical’ and 
(2) ‘the empirical’ primarily or exclusively to  ‘the  scientific’.  Scientific  
inquiries are permeated by normative assumptions, principles, conventions, 
and standards; indeed,  the former may serve to define the  latter. 
Philosophical inquiries  are informed by empirical facts,  considerations,  
studies,  and  insights;  indeed,  the former, insofar as they engage with the  
‘real’  world,  are  shaped  by  the  latter. The picture that emerges, then,  is  far  




● ‘Intra-Existential’ Laypersons vs. ‘Meta-Existential’ Experts: Chernilo seems to 
presume that the practice of posing ‘the big questions’ – notably with regard 
to the nature of human beings and the meaning of life – is more common 
among experts than among laypersons: 
 
while the ‘what is a human being’ question may not often be posed by individuals 
themselves (with the exception of professional intellectuals who do so in their 
‘expert’ capacity), questions about god, freedom and immortality are key 
existential questions about the ‘meaning of life’ in both its transcendental and [its] 
immanent dimensions.147 
 
This view is problematic in at least  two  respects:  it  is  empirically  flawed,  
because ordinary  people  do  grapple  with  ‘the  big  questions’  (and,  
arguably,  do so more frequently than Chernilo is willing  to  admit),  not  least  
when they  are faced with existential challenges and dilemmas; it is 
normatively flawed, because it portrays everyday life as a largely unreflective  
affair,  in  which  the  main participants, due to a lack of critical capacity and 
intellectual curiosity, remain caught in a cloud of doxic misperceptions, 
misinterpretations, and misrepresentations. Social  life,  however,  is  always  
already  both  an  intra-  and  a meta-existential affair – not only for those who  
study  it,  but  also  for  those who construct and experience it. 
 
● Descriptive vs. Normative: Throughout his study, Chernilo draws a distinction 
between ‘the descriptive’ and ‘the normative’. In the context of his inquiry, this 
conceptual separation is problematic for several reasons. 
(1) As Chernilo implies in his Arendtian take on ‘normative descriptions’,148 the 
aforementioned distinction is questionable in that these two levels of 
epistemic involvement are inextricably linked. Drawing on Arendt, Chernilo 
gives an illustrative example (that is, a concentration camp as ‘hell on 
earth’149). He does not concede, however, that, strictly speaking, all 
descriptions have a (covertly or overtly) normative character. This normativist 
insight obliges us to reflect on the social contingency pervading the 
production, circulation, and consumption of all knowledge: 
First, given that knowledge is always socially embedded, it is necessarily 
normative (Erkenntnisnormativität).  Second,  since  knowledge  is  always  
generated  from   a specific position in the social space, even so-called 
descriptive knowledge is situation-laden (Erkenntnisstandpunkt). Third, to the 
extent that bodily actors, regardless of whether they are laypersons or 
experts, take on particular roles in society, knowledge is permeated by the 
relationally constituted functions fulfilled by those who make use of it in 
accordance with their contextually defined interests (Erkenntnisfunktion). 
Fourth, considering that cognitive actors are discursively competing entities, 
the production of knowledge is permeated by scientific power struggles 
(Erkenntniskampf). Fifth, because symbolic and informational resources can 
be used in various ways and for multiple reasons, the production of 
knowledge can be instrumentalized for extra-scientific – notably, economic – 
purposes (Erkenntnisnutzung). In short, the positivist quest for objectivity 
loses credibility when confronted with the relational constitution of epistemic 
enquiry. The conditions of knowledgeability are impregnated with 




(2) As elucidated in preceding sections, ‘the idea of a normative description 
coheres around three basic commitments’151: a universalist conception of 
humanity, an evaluativist conception of normativity, and a critical conception 
of the social sciences. What is striking about Chernilo’s justification of these 
three commitments, however, is that it focuses on ‘normative descriptions’ at 
the abstract level of intellectual, academic, scientific, or institutional 
discourses, rather than at the concrete level of people’s lifeworlds. 
Unsympathetic critics may object that such an abstract conception of 
normativity is ‘pale, male, and stale’ – that is, largely disconnected from the 
heterogeneity, diversity, and complexity of people’s everyday lives across 
different sectors of society. 
(3) As subjects capable of speech, reflection, and action, we are able to produce 
numerous types of knowledge: 
(i) as representational beings, we are able to produce descriptive 
knowledge; 
(ii) as analytical beings, we construct systematic knowledge; 
(iii) as reflexive beings, we are capable of developing explanatory 
knowledge; 
(iv) as critical beings, we generate normative knowledge; 
(v) as communicative beings, we participate in the exchange of discursive 
knowledge; 
(vi) as learning beings, we build on cumulative knowledge; 
(vii) as projective beings, we can make assumptions about the future on the 
basis of predictive knowledge.152 
 
If we focus exclusively on the descriptive and normative aspects of human 
knowledge production (even if we recognize their intertwinement), then we 
fail to account for the multiplicity of its empowering functions. Human actors 
can draw on manifold types of knowledge when engaging with the world in a 
purposive, communicative, discursive, and/or creative manner. 
 
● Universal(ist) vs. Particular(ist): Chernilo affirms that a ‘universalistic principle 
of humanity is to be preferred over particularistic conceptions of race, culture, 
identity, and indeed class’.153 On this view, the former transcends both the 
structural and the agential contingency of the latter. Such a universalist stance, 
then, insists that our species-distinctive features serve as both the most viable 
and the most reliable foundation for justifying normative arguments. As 
members of the same species, we pursue human interests, which are, by 
definition, universalizable. As individuals and members of different groups, we 
pursue personal and social interests, which are, paradoxically, both unifying 
and divisive. Chernilo provides little in the way of         a critical analysis of the 
extent to which ‘particularist’ categories (including the ones he mentions) can 
– rightly or wrongly – be invoked as ‘universalist’ foundations of human 
emancipation. Marx’s account of class struggle is based on the assumption 
that, eventually, it will culminate in ‘universal’ or ‘human’ (rather than 
‘particular’ or merely ‘political’) emancipation, once a classless society 
emerges. Fascists presuppose the allegedly ‘universalist’ nature of their 
project, asserting that nature’s ‘survival of the fittest’ principle is present in 
struggles for ‘national and/or racial
 
 
supremacy’. Religious proselytizers believe in, and propagate, the universalist 
nature of redemption. In brief, ideological metanarratives – even if they may 
be deconstructed as reflecting an essentially particularist outlook on the world 
– are ‘universalist’ in the sense that they claim to be all-encompassing.154 The 
universalism/ particularism dichotomy is more blurred than Chernilo seems 
to admit. 
 
● Anthropological vs. Social: Chernilo contends that ‘[t]he anthropological 
features  that define us as human beings are to a large extent independent from, 
but cannot be realized in full outside, social life’155 – that is, they are 
‘autonomous vis-à-vis society even if their actualization is itself social’.156 The 
problem with this assumption is  that, once again, it is based on a misleading 
dichotomy between ‘anthropological’ and ‘social’. He is right to insist that our 
anthropological features cannot be realized outside social life. He needs to go a 
step further, however, by highlighting that the former are always and 
unavoidably dependent on, rather than independent of, the latter – and vice 
versa. We may focus on the ‘anthropological features’ discussed in this 
volume: self-transcendence, adaptation, responsibility, language, strong evalua- 
tions, reflexivity, and the reproduction of life. Moreover, we may take into 
consideration other elements, which are rightly or wrongly associated with 
the human condition: culture, language, consciousness, self-awareness, morality, 
aesthetic judgement, and reason – to mention only a few. None of these 
species-constitutive elements can be empirically or historically dissociated 
from social life. The former owe their very existence to the latter. Chernilo’s 
‘universalist transcendentalism’ understates the significance of the sociality 
that pervades all species-constitutive  dimensions of humanity. 
 
 
2.6. Average members? 
Chernilo maintains that ‘[a]verage members of the human species are all similarly 
endowed with general anthropological capacities that make a key contribution to 
life in society’.157 It is far from clear, however, how it is possible to determine what 
an ‘average member of the human species’ is supposed to be, let alone how to 
measure the degree to which all of them are equipped with ‘general 
anthropological capacities’. In fact, these capacities are profoundly shaped by the 
asymmetrical distribution of resources and power, owing to the stratifying 
influence of key sociological variables such as class, ethnicity, gender, age, and 
ability. 
Does a person’s limited access to social resources – which, if available, allow for 
one’s cognitive, intellectual, emotional, physical, linguistic, and moral development 
– make her ‘less human’ than a person who is equipped with numerous (notably 
social, cultural, political, educational, economic, financial, and symbolic) forms of 
capital? Is a person who is ‘exceptionally cultured’, ‘extremely eloquent’, ‘highly 
intelligent’, and ‘always guided by reason’ essentially ‘more human’ than a person 
who is (partially or entirely) deprived of these ‘capacities’? Is an underclass, 
indigenous, female, homosexual, elderly, physically and mentally disabled person 
‘less human’ than a bourgeois, white European, male, heterosexual, young, 




Chernilo’s  ‘anthropological  universalism’,  however,   runs  the   risk   of  
endorsing  a hierarchy of desirable skills and attributes whereby those ‘at the top’ 
are closer to his ideal of humanity than those ‘at the bottom’. One need not be an 
expert in the history of eugenics to grasp the enormous dangers arising from 
arbitrary (socially constructed) hierarchies according to which some humans are 
better equipped with ‘general anthropological capacities’ than others. 
 
 
2.7. Imaginary cosmopolitanism vs. real-world tribalism? 
In a universalist fashion, Chernilo affirms that ‘[h]uman beings recognize one 
another as members of the same species because of these shared anthropological 
endowments’.158 In Chernilo’s defence, this assertion is accurate, both in a realist 
sense and in a normativist sense: 
 
● In a realist sense, it is accurate because human actors are not able to build a 
society unless they recognize each other as creatures belonging to the same 
species and sharing a number of fundamental features, even if and when they 
do so implicitly and/or unconsciously. For instance, when subjects capable of 
speech and action communicate with one another linguistically (that is, by 
raising validity claims on the basis of the morphological, semantic, syntactical, 
grammatical, phonetic, and pragmatic resources of their language), they 
presuppose that those involved in the process are equipped with the 
anthropological endowments necessary to function as fully fledged members of 
a speech community. 
● In a normativist sense, it is accurate because there is no point in making a case 
for individual and collective forms of emancipation unless we assume that all 
humans share a number of species-constitutive characteristics, to which – 
especially in moments of struggle for universal(ist) ideas (and ideals), such as 
justice, dignity,  democracy, and the good life – they may make explicit and/or 
conscious reference. For instance, when some subjects capable of speech and 
action are temporarily or permanently deprived of the right to communicate 
with others linguistically, they may challenge the discriminatory mechanisms 
leading to their exclusion by insisting on their status as fully fledged members 
of humanity in general and of a speech community in particular. 
 
Irrespective of the realist and normativist value of Chernilo’s argument, however, 
he overestimates the (universalist) force of cosmopolitanism and underestimates the 
(particularist) force of tribalism. People’s sense of connection to particular social 
groups – expressed in the implicit or explicit defence of their tribal identities – is 
often more powerful, tangible, and decisive than their sense of attachment to the 
somewhat abstract notion of humanity. Tribal affiliations with particular social 
groups (defined by class,  ethnicity, gender,  age,  ability,  and/or  other  key  
sociological  variables)  may  be  both a bonding and a divisive force: just as they 
provide people with a sense of belonging   and inclusion (in relation to ‘insiders’), 
they foster a sense of demarcation and exclusion (in relation to ‘outsiders’). 
Consider, once again, the example of speech communities: 
 
 
● Speech communities are internally divided (that is, within specific languages) 
by the stratifying power of key sociological variables (such as class, ethnicity, 
gender, age, ability, etc.). These divisions are reflected in hierarchies of 
legitimacy, reproduced by socially defined patterns of intelligibility, and 
sustained by the triadic interplay of linguistic fields, habitus, and capital.159 
● Speech communities are externally divided (that is, between different 
languages) by the stratifying power of language itself. Different languages are 
based on different (morphological, semantic, syntactical, grammatical, 
phonetic, and pragmatic) rules and standards.160 
 
Given its social function (in terms of providing a sense of belonging and cohesion) 
and its interpretative function (in terms of providing a ‘house of being’ inhabited 
and experienced as a ‘treasure of meaning’), it is no accident that language is both a  
bonding and    a divisive force: we can relate to those who speak the same language 
as we do, because it is through them that we attribute meaning to the world in a 
hermeneutically sound fashion; we cannot (or may find it difficult to) relate to 
those who do not speak the same language as we do, because we do not share their 
culturally codified and symbolically mediated  horizon of meaning.161 
The same dialectic of universality and particularity applies to all other 
anthropological characteristics – including culture, consciousness, self-awareness, 
morality, aesthetic judgement, and reason. In short, the  orbit of anthropological 
endowments is as much a context-transcendent realm of species-constitutive 
universality as it is a context-dependent sphere of species-divisive particularities. 
 
2.8. Disciplinary confusion? 
Some assertions that Chernilo makes in relation to the academic disciplines in 
question are rather confusing. For example, it is not accurate to state that, at the 
time of Husserl’s intellectual dominance in Germany, ‘philosophical anthropology 
seemed second-rate  philosophy’.162 If anything, it might have been considered 
‘second-rate anthropology’ (with a strong philosophical component). In a similar 
vein, unsympathetic critics may reject the project of ‘philosophical sociology’ as 
‘second-rate sociology’ or ‘abstract sociology’ (with a strong philosophical 
component). 
On a more substantive note, one may ask whether or not it may also be 
promising to pursue the project of a ‘sociological philosophy’. Admittedly, ‘social 
philosophy’ and ‘political philosophy’ are well-established areas of inquiry, 
drawing on sociology (notably social theory) and political science (notably political 
theory). It would be difficult, however, to come across a large number of scholars 
defining themselves as ‘sociological philosophers’. The gatekeeper mentality 
shared by some (but by no means all) philosophers expresses a disciplinary 
attitude that shows little intellectual appreciation for the conceptual toolbox of an 
empirical discipline such as sociology. 
Strictly speaking, one may argue that both labels – that is, both ‘philosophical 
sociology’ and ‘sociological philosophy’ – are tautological: there is no serious 
sociological research unless it is informed by philosophical reflections on  the  
nature  of  being, knowledge, morality, logic, and aesthetics; likewise, there is no 





extent to which all human life forms are fundamentally  shaped  by  socially  con-  
tingent practices, structures, and constellations. 
What    about    the    role    of    homo sociologicus,   homo oeconomicus,  and  homo 
psychologicus? 
 
● To conceive of homo sociologicus,163 first and foremost, ‘as stable and 
predictable role-conforming behaviour’164 does not require us – as implied by 
Chernilo (referring to Dahrendorf) – to give up on the possibility of ‘describing 
the nature of man accurately and realistically’.165 
● The notion that homo oeconomicus166 is, above all, about ‘the calculation of 
possibilities for personal gain’167 based on rational decisions is problematic in 
that it overlooks the fact that numerous strands in economics (especially those 
borrowing from sociology and social psychology) recognize that human 
behaviour is profoundly influenced by social factors. 
● To associate homo psychologicus,168 primarily, with the study of ‘unconscious 
motifs’169 is misleading insofar as this investigative focus is shared by some 
(notably psychoanalytic), but by no means all, branches in psychology. 
 
Interdisciplinary studies of homo sociologicus, homo oeconomicus, and homo 
psychologicus aim to grasp ‘that particular point at which the individual and society 
intersect’.170 It is reductive, however, to suggest that ‘none offers a comprehensive theory 
of human nature but is instead construed as a unilateral exaggeration of one particular 
anthropological feature  that has proved particularly useful from one, equally 
particular, disciplinary point of view’.171 
Granted, it has become unpopular to defend the notion that there is such a thing as 
‘human nature’. Indeed, numerous intellectual traditions in the humanities and social 
sciences – notably constructivism, perspectivism, deconstructionism, postmodernism, 
post-structuralism, postcolonialism, and feminism – reject the idea of ‘human nature’ 
altogether, not least because it can be (and has been) used as an ideological weapon of 
social domination to legitimize social inequalities, especially those based on ‘class’, 
‘race’, ‘sex’, ‘age’, and ‘ability’. Still, the aforementioned disciplines – that is, 
sociology, economics, and psychology – have produced foundational conceptions of 
human nature within major currents of thought (such as Marxism, functionalism, 
evolutionism, rationalism, structuralism, etc.). They have done so, to a considerable 
extent, by cross-fertilizing knowledge from neighbouring areas of investigation. Of 
course, Chernilo is right to stress that every discipline tends to mobilize (if not, to 
exaggerate) key epistemological and ontological presuppositions that sustain its 
own discipline-specific horizon of inquiry. Most disciplines do so, however, by 
drawing on multiple treasures of knowledge and, hence, by transcending 
(admittedly, to different degrees) epistemic boundaries. One reason for this is that 
comprehensive (and remotely satisfying) answers to ‘the big questions’ can be 
developed only by building on several disciplines. Another reason for this is that 
most prominent intellectual traditions are embedded in, and developed through, 
diverse (co-existing and competing) disciplinary and subdisciplinary frameworks. 
 
2.9. Bourdieu’s ‘normative-less’ humanity? 




(1) He asserts that Bourdieu ‘does not conceptualize normativity 
sociologically’172 and that ‘normative ideas are not included as an actual 
dimension of the social world because conflict and power struggles are 
deemed enough for a fully formed ontology of the social’.173 
(2) He affirms that Bourdieu puts forward ‘a reductionist notion of self-interest 
at the anthropological level’,174 which is coupled with ‘an equally 
reductionist conception of the social as a space of constant struggle’.175 
(3) He contends that Bourdieu remains trapped in an ‘irrationalist conception of 
human nature’,176 which ‘mirrors those offered by equally one-sided 
arguments on, say, primordial authenticity’.177 
 
On this view, Bourdieu is guilty of endorsing (1) a ‘“normative-less” depiction of 
social life’,178 (2) a reductive understanding of the social in general and of human 
self-interest in particular, as well as (3) a one-sided and ‘irrationalist’ 
interpretation of human nature. This reading of Bourdieu’s work, however, can be 
challenged on the following grounds: 
 
(1) Bourdieu does conceptualize normativity sociologically; his  approach  does 
include normative ideas as an actual dimension  of  the  social  world;  
conflict and power struggles are not deemed enough for a fully formed 
ontology of the social. In fact, Bourdieu’s concepts of illusio, doxa, and 
symbolic power – not to mention his early writings on ideology – clearly 
indicate an acute awareness not only of the pivotal role that normativity 
plays in the construction of social life,  but also of the multilayered 
constitution of human existence. Bourdieu may overstate the significance of 
conflict and power struggles, leading to a form of  socio-ontological fatalism. 
This does not mean, however, that he fails to present   a rich analysis of 
normativity – notably with regard to symbolic forms – in his  writings.179 
(2) Bourdieu’s conception of (self-)interest, although one may have good reason 
to question its validity, is more complex and fine-grained than Chernilo 
suggests. According to Bourdieu, agents have (and pursue) a multiplicity of 
interests, in accordance with the multiplicity of social fields in which they 
find themselves  immersed: cultural, political, educational, economic, 
linguistic – to mention just a few. To the extent that Bourdieu posits that, 
ultimately, every social action is not only power- and interest-laden but also 
power- and interest-driven, his social ontology  is  indeed   reductive.   To   the   
extent,   however,   that   he   provides  a polycentric (if not centreless) 
account of multiple competing fields, his social  ontology is multifaceted.180 
(3) Not least due to his radical critique of biological essentialism, Bourdieu does 
not endorse any conception of ‘human nature’, at least not explicitly. One 
may object that he effectively (i.e. implicitly) subscribes to a fatalistic notion 
of ‘human nature’, insofar as he portrays social life as a conglomerate of 
social fields, which are tantamount to ‘social games’, shaped by constant 
struggle for access to vital forms of capital and resources.181 This, however, 
does not justify the claim that he remains caught in an ‘irrationalist’ 




In short, Chernilo’s reading of Bourdieu’s work, which essentially accuses him of 
reductionism, is reductive itself. It is true that Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’,182 
unlike Boltanski’s ‘sociology of critique’,183 privileges the epistemic authority of 
scientists and experts over that of ordinary people, thus paving the way for 
‘sociology’s very own self-fulfilling dystopia’184 and a somewhat fatalistic view of 
everyday life.185 This substantial limitation, however, does not mean that, from a 
Bourdieusian perspective, social life is essentially ‘normative-less’. 
 
2.10. Between universalism and constructivism? 
Drawing on Michel Foucault,186 Chernilo announces that ‘[i]deas of humanity are of 
course socially constructed, change historically and are full of highly problematic 
assumptions at cognitive, theological, and normative levels’.187 He does not 
convincingly explain, however, how it is possible to reconcile social constructivism 
with the normative universalism that underlies his argument. If human rights are 
socially constructed, then they cannot be universally binding and those who 
advocate them cannot seriously defend their cross-cultural,  let  alone  context-
transcending,  validity.  We  may  endorse  either a constructivist/contextualist or a 
universalist/foundationalist conception of human rights, but we cannot have it 
both ways. Chernilo rightly criticizes posthumanists for failing to ‘articulate their 
normative positions because they are unable to clarify what [. . .] the human core for 
which they are prepared to make a positive case’188 actually is. If, however, we aim 
to make a case for a normative position based on merely constructivist grounds, 
then the criteria invoked are categorically uncategorical and, hence, largely 
arbitrary. Categorical imperatives may be categorically uncategorical, in the sense 
that they are contingent upon normatively and/or subjectively variable criteria and 
circumstances. If, however, one wishes to subscribe to such a constructivist 
approach, then there is not much – if any – room left for the pursuit of a viable 
normative universalism. 
 
2.11. Our (non)shared humanity? 
Chernilo announces that ‘our shared humanity has become increasingly important 
(but also challenging) for humans themselves’.189 One issue with this statement is 
the tautological nature of the concept of ‘common humanity’. If humanity is what 
all members of our species have in common, then it is, by definition, shared. Strictly 
speaking, there is no such thing as ‘a nonshared humanity’. Another problem is the 
issue of species-constitutive (in)equality. Cynics may provocatively declare that 
just as some are more  ‘equal’ than others, some are more ‘human’ than others. In  
other words,  a noteworthy problem with identifying a set of ‘anthropological 
features’ (such as culture, language, consciousness, self-awareness, morality, 
aesthetic judgement, and reason) is that some actors may be better equipped with 
them than others. This takes    us back to the aforementioned issue of inventing 
evolutionary hierarchies in terms of  varying degrees of ‘general anthropological 
capacities’. Finally, is ‘our shared humanity’ really more important (and 
challenging) for us now than it was for previous generations in, say, 1789, 1848, 
1914, 1918, 1933, 1939, 1945, 1986, or 1989/1990? Granted, climate change and 
the possibility of global nuclear destruction present challenges of  unprecedented 
scale.    Instead   of   overstating   its   current   relevance, however, we should 
 
 
recognize that ‘our shared humanity’ has been a central concern in previous 
chapters of human history. 
 
2.12. The human, the social, and the normative: between optimism and  
pessimism? 
Chernilo rightly insists that ‘our conceptions of the human underpin our normative 
notions in social life’.190 It is no less important, however, to acknowledge that, at the 
same time, our normative notions in social life underpin our conceptions of the 
human. An optimistic conception of the human may underlie a romantic notion of 
social life, and vice versa; at the same time, a pessimistic conception of the human 
may underlie a fatalistic notion of social life, and vice versa. 
 
● Consider the major political ideologies of the modern era. Advocates of 
anarchism, communism, and socialism tend to conceive of humans as co-
operative, altruistic, and relatively malleable. Supporters of conservatism, by 
contrast, tend to portray humans as competitive, selfish, and relatively 
unmalleable. The former’s (optimistic) conception of the human is reflected in 
the belief that it is possible to construct      a society largely, if not entirely, free 
of mechanisms of exploitation, exclusion, and domination. The latter’s 
(pessimistic) conception of the human is illustrated in the dictum that a strong 
state is necessary to ensure law and order and that, furthermore, social 
institutions are needed to guarantee that individuals’ actions are guided by a 
sense of duty and responsibility to ‘their nation’. 
● Consider major explanatory frameworks in academic disciplines concerned 
with the constitution of human existence. Proponents of social 
constructivism assume that humans are, to a significant extent, products of 
their socio-cultural environments. Believers in biological determinism, on 
the other hand, presuppose that humans are, largely or entirely, 
determined by their genetic make-up. The former’s (optimistic) conception 
of the human is expressed in the view that people can flourish and realize 
their emancipatory potential as long as the right social conditions that 
allow them to do so are put in place. The latter’s (pessimistic – or, as some 
may argue, realistic) conception of the human is articulated in the 
contention that people are equipped with a set of genetically determined 
predispositions, which – although  their development is contingent on 
their interactions with spatiotemporally variable conditions – largely or 
entirely determine the scope of their practices. 
 
In brief, just as our conceptions of the human underpin our normative notions in social 
life, our normative notions in social life underpin our conceptions of the human. 
Chernilo’s  project, however, understates the extent to which normativity is a 
central, rather than peripheral, element of social existence: 
Philosophical sociology does not claim that normativity is the centre of social life but 
contends that social life cannot be fully accounted for without this kind of explicit 
normative orientation.191 
Normative orientations are as much part of scientific attempts to study different 
aspects                  of                social             life              as           they            are           part      




human life forms, in the sense that all social practices, structures, and arrangements 
are culturally codified and, hence, permeated by contextually variable normative 
standards. As sociological studies of the seemingly most mundane human activities 
(such as thinking, walking, speaking, eating, sleeping, washing, engaging in sexual 
intercourse, etc.) demonstrate, normativity lies at the heart of social life. 
Arguably, Chernilo is guilty of socio-ontological romanticism, in the sense that he 
suggests that the quality of behavioural, ideological, and institutional forms of 
sociality can be assessed in terms of the degree to which they promote or obstruct 
‘the development of our generic human potentials’.192 This, of course, is a laudable 
undertaking, but we need to accept that there are not only productive and 
emancipatory but also destructive and malevolent ‘generic human potentials’. 
Chernilo tends to overstate the significance of the former and to understate the 
significance of the latter. Just as we need to generate behavioural, ideological, and 
institutional forms of sociality that foster the development of the former, we need to 
create historical conditions that hinder the unfolding of the latter. A realist view of 
social life faces up to the fact that a set of profound normative tensions – such as 
good vs. evil, co-operative vs. competitive, altruistic vs. egoistic, peaceful vs. violent, 
serene vs. aggressive, friendly vs. belligerent, reason-guided vs. impulsive – is built 
into the human condition.193 We cannot simply focus on the ‘generic human 
potentials’ that suit us when anchoring the normative foundations of a philosophical 
sociology in the ontological foundations of humanity. We also need to include those 
‘generic human potentials’ that expose the dark side of humanity if we seek to 
develop a truly comprehensive notion of normativity, capable of accounting for the 
tension-laden nature of society.194 
 
Summary 
Debating Humanity is a major contribution to contemporary social and political 
thought. Chernilo’s attempt to develop an outline of a ‘philosophical sociology’ is a 
worthwhile endeavour, especially at a time when it has become increasingly 
unpopular to defend universalist conceptions of the human – not least due to the 
wide-ranging influence of largely socio-constructivist approaches (notably those 
associated with postmodernism, poststructuralism, postcolonialism, feminism, and 
intersectionalism) on the humanities and social sciences. Some parts of Chernilo’s 
argument are highly perceptive and thoughtful; others, however, remain 
contentious and problematic. Regardless of its controversial aspects and 
limitations, Chernilo’s study is a powerful reminder of the   fact that a truly 
comprehensive understanding of society requires a critical engagement with the 
concept of humanity. 
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